INTRODUCTION
In an extensive form game, a combination of a behavior strategy profile and a belief system is called an assessment. Such an assessment is a Ž . sequential equilibrium Kreps and Wilson, 1982 if it satisfies sequential rationality and consistency. A sequential equilibrium can be viewed as Ž . Ž . properly extending Selten's ideas of subgame perfectness 1965, 1975 . The first condition, sequential rationality, is equivalent to a system of polynomial inequalities and is therefore straightforward to check. Checking consistency, however, is in general much harder because the definition requires sequences of assessments. A formal definition of consistent assessments is given in Section 2.
Ž . In Section 3 we present the central result of this paper Theorem 3.1 , which is a purely algebraic characterization of consistent assessments: It does not make any use of sequences and limits, but characterizes consistent assessments by two algebraic conditions. The first condition is a restriction pertaining to the supports of the strategies and beliefs. It turns out that checking this restriction is equivalent to solving a linear program, an insight which plays an important role in the algorithm indicated below. The second condition of the characterization implies that we can put mistake probabilities on the actions played with probability zero in such a way that the relative beliefs are equal to the relative realization probabilities of the corresponding nodes. The relationship between relative probabilities and consistency of assessments is also considered in Kohlberg and Ž . Ž . Reny 1991 and McLennan 1989a , 1989b . Before stating the proof of this theorem, we provide an example illustrating how this result can be used to check whether a given assessment is consistent.
This central result will be applied in several ways. First, as is shown at the end of Section 3, the proof of Theorem 3.1 can be used to prove that a consistent assessment can always be approximated by a sequence of completely mixed assessments of a very simple form, determined by just a few parameters.
Second, in Section 4, the characterization is used to develop an algorithm which computes the set of consistent assessments in a given extensive form game.
Finally, the characterization makes it possible to give a geometrical description of the set of consistent assessments in Section 5. As a byproduct of this description, it can be shown rather easily that the set of consistent assessments is semialgebraic, which means that it can be described by a finite number of polynomial inequalities. Since sequential rationality is equivalent to a finite system of polynomial inequalities, it follows directly that the set of sequential equilibria is semialgebraic, a Ž . result which has already been shown by Blume and Zame 1994 .
Moreover, yϱ q yϱ [ yϱ whereas yϱ y yϱ is not defined.
Ž . For a finite set A, ⌬ A is the set of all probability distributions on A. For a matrix M we denote the transposed matrix by M t .
MODEL AND DEFINITIONS

Notation in Extensi¨e Form Games
In an extensive form game, the information sets are denoted by h, whereas H is the collection of all information sets. By X we denote the set of all nonterminal nodes. The set of terminal nodes is denoted by Z. At Ž . an information set h, A h is the set of actions available at h. The sets Ž . Ž . Ž . A h should be such that A h and A hЈ are disjoint whenever h and hЈ are different. We assume that the extensive form games considered have Ž . perfect recall see Kuhn, 1953 . A formal description of extensive form Ž . games can be found in Kreps and Wilson 1982 .
Consistent Assessments
Ž
. A beha¨ior strategy profile BSP is a function which assigns to every Ž . information set h a probability distribution on A h . A belief system is h a function ␤ which assigns to every information set h a probability Ž . distribution ␤ on the nodes in this information set. A combination , ␤ h of a BSP and a belief system is called an assessment.
Ž . An assessment , ␤ is called Bayesian consistent if at every information set which is reached with positive probability the beliefs are derived Ž . according to Bayes' rule. So for every h with ‫ސ‬ h ) 0 it must hold that
Ž . for every x g h. Here, ‫ސ‬ x and ‫ސ‬ h denote the probabilities that the node x and the information set h, respectively, are reached if is played.
Ž . An assessment , ␤ is called consistent if there is a sequence
,␤ of completely mixed, Bayesian consistent assessments con-
verging to , ␤ . Completely mixed means that every action is played with positive probability. Obviously, consistency implies Bayesian consistency.
CHARACTERIZATION OF CONSISTENT ASSESSMENTS
Before formulating our main result, we need some further definitions. Ž . q Ž . For an assessment , ␤ , A denotes the set of actions played with q Ž . positive probability and by X ␤ we mean the set of nodes with positive q Ž .
q belief. The restriction of on the actions in A is denoted by . By 0 Ž . A we denote the set of actions played with probability zero whereas 0 Ž . X ␤ denotes the set of nodes with belief zero.
Ž . Ž . w x A pseudo-BSP is a system s of functions : A h ª 0, 1 .
h hg H h Ž . In contrast with BSP's, the sum of the probabilities of the actions in A h does not need to be equal to 1 in a pseudo-BSP. A pseudo-BSP is called completely mixed if every action is played with positive probability.
Ž . Ž . For a pseudo-BSP , ‫ސ‬ x and ‫ސ‬ h are defined in a similar way as for a BSP.
The following theorem gives an algebraic characterization of consistent assessments. In the theorem, we denote by A the set of actions which 
q Ž . for all nodes x, y g X ␤ in the same information set.
Ž .
Intuitively, condition 1 says that we can put mistake probabilities on the zero probability actions such that ␤ places positive belief exactly on those nodes which are reached with maximum mistake probability. There-Ž q Ž . q Ž .. fore, this condition checks whether the combination A , X ␤ is Ž . possible in a consistent assessment. Condition 2 states that we can put mistake probabilities on the zero probability actions such that the relative probabilities of the nodes with positive belief are equal to the relative beliefs.
Ž . Condition 1 is somewhat related to the notion of a b-labelling, used by Ž . Kreps and Wilson 1982 in their Lemma A1. Furthermore, there is a Ž . Ž b b . connection between condition 2 and the mapping , which can be found in Lemma A2 of the same paper.
Before proving this theorem, we give an example in order to illustrate Ž . Ž . the meaning of conditions 1 and 2 in the theorem. Moreover, this example shows how the characterization can be used to check whether a given assessment is consistent or not. as , bs , es , and f s .
Ž . Ž . Ž .
Obviously, it holds that
Ž . for all x, y lying in the same information set. Hence, condition 2 in Theorem 3.1 is satisfied.
Ž . Condition 1 in this theorem is also satisfied by choosing
Ž . ␤ y s , and ␤ z s . Ž . Assume that condition 1 in Theorem 3.1 would be satisfied for some
Ž . which implies that e ) f . However, this would mean that a и Ž . Ž . Ž .
Ž . Ž . condition 1 can not be satisfied. By Theorem 3.1, , ␤ is not a consistent assessment. ¢ 0 otherwise.
Ž . Furthermore, we define the vector s s s by
Ž . Here, C is the collection of chance moves on the path to x and c is the x positive probability that the chance move c occurs.
Ž . Let the vector b s b be given by
Ž . where log 0 [ yϱ. Note that b can be yϱ since ␤ x can be 0. 
The inequality w F y1 should be read . coordinatewise. Obviously, B is a closed and convex set. Moreover, B is nonempty since w k g B for large k. It follows that C is a nonempty closed convex set. Suppose that 0 f C. Then, there exists a hyperplane which Ä 4 separates the sets C and 0 strongly. In other words, we can find a nonzero vector p and a number ␣ g ‫ޒ‬ such that p и c ) ␣ for all c g C and p и 0 -␣. The last inequality implies that ␣ ) 0. From the first inequality, it follows that 
1
A linear system of equations Mx s¨, where¨can contain infinities, is said to have an
, we obtain by taking the exponential function on both sides and using the definitions of b ,¨, and m that
s ‫ސ‬ r x Ž . Ž .
q Ž . for every x g X which implies condition 2 in Theorem 3.1.
Since M q w s 0 it follows that
for every x g X Ž . Ž . for every x g X . Finally, we define the constants a by a [ exp w a for every a g A 0 . Since the proof in the other direction is similar, the proof of Theorem 3.1 is complete. B
Consistency and Simple Sequences of Assessments
As a corollary of Theorem 3.1, we show that we can restrict ourselves to a very special class of sequences of completely mixed assessments if we want to check whether a given assessment is consistent or not. These sequences, which we call simple, have the property that they are completely determined by assigning two parameters to every action. As a consequence, the infinitely dimensional problem of checking consistency is reduced to a finitely dimensional problem.
Ž . Ž x action a there are numbers a ) 0 and a g 0, 1 such that 
AN ALGORITHM
In this section we provide an algorithm to compute the set of consistent assessments in an extensive form game. First, we introduce some further notation and discuss several lemmas which play an essential role in the development of the algorithm.
In an extensive form game ⌫, we denote the set of consistent assess- 
The proof follows directly from Lemma 3.2.
There is a basis for Ker M which consists of integer ectors.
is an integer matrix, we can transform M with the Gauss-elimination method into a rational upper-triangular matrix. Ž Obviously, the kernel of this triangular matrix and, hence, the kernel of
has a basis consisting of rational vectors. By multiplying these vectors with an appropriate integer, we obtain a basis consisting of integer vectors. B 
2 The inequalities w F y1 and M 0 w F y1 should be read coordinatewise. Now, we are able to construct an algorithm which generates the set of consistent assessments. The algorithm is based on the following steps.
Step 1. Choose A q , X q and compute the corresponding matrix M.
Step 2. Solve the LP-problem ''Is there a vector w F y1 with M q w s 0 and M 0 w F y1?'' with the simplex method. If the answer is ''yes,'' then go to step 3. c Ž. Ž If the answer is ''no,'' then A A A , X is empty and go to Step 1 until. every combination A , X has been chosen .
Step 3. Compute a basis n , . . . , n for Ker M consisting of c Ž. integer vectors with the Gauss-elimination method.
Go to
Step 1 until every combination A , X has been chosen .
If we translate the linear equations in
Step 3 into the original strategies and the original beliefs ␤ by taking the exponential function on both sides, we obtain a system of polynomial equations in and ␤. A different algorithm to compute such polynomial equations can be found in Kohlberg Ž . and Reny 1991 . In the following example, we apply the algorithm in order to compute c Ž. one particular set A A A , X for the extensive form game of Example 1. The corresponding matrix M is given by
Step 2. Since X 
fore, the equations n и b ␤ s n и s are all equivalent to the equa-
Ž .
2 1 q Ž . since s s 0 for all x g X. If we take the exponential function on both x sides, we obtain the equation 
STRUCTURE OF THE SET OF CONSISTENT ASSESSMENTS
In this section, we give a geometrical description of the set of consistent assessments. To this purpose, we use some results derived in the previous section.
Let ⌫ be an extensive form game and the sets A q , X q be fixed. By c Ž.
c Ž.
Corollary 4.4 we know that either
q the set of assessments , ␤ with A s A , X ␤ s X , and
for all i. If we take the exponential function on both sides and use the q Ž . q Ž . Ž . n every a, b ) 0 we have that ac q bc g C. We call a set C ; ‫*ޒ‬ a cone if there is a vector¨g ‫ޒ‬ n and a cone CЈ with vertex 0 such that
A set L ; ‫ޒ‬ n is said to be a logarithmic cone if log L is a cone. Hence, a logarithmic cone can be transformed into a cone by taking the coordinatewise logarithm. Since the variables a , ␤ x with a f A , x f X do not appear in Ž. these equations, the set L A , X can be written as Since A A is a finite product of simplices, it follows that A A c is the intersection of a finite product of simplices with a finite number of logarithmic cones.
3 B Ž . In Blume and Zame 1994 it has been shown that the set of sequential Ž equilibria is a semialgebraic set. A set is called semialgebraic if it is the finite union of sets determined by a finite number of polynomial inequali-. ties. These inequalities may be strict or non-strict. Using our insights about consistent assessments, this result can be shown within a few lines.
Ž. Obviously, the sets L A , X in the proof of Theorem 5.2 are semialgebraic sets. Since A A is also semialgebraic, it follows that the set of consistent assessments is semialgebraic. We already know that the set of sequentially rational assessments is semialgebraic since sequential rationality is equivalent to a finite number of polynomial inequalities. Hence, the set of sequential equilibria is the intersection of two semialgebraic sets and is therefore semialgebraic itself. COROLLARY 5.3. The set of sequential equilibria is a semialgebraic set.
